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SURROGACY – IS IT MORE DIFFICULT TO RELINQUISH GENES? 
Pip Trowse 
Surrogacy has produced some positive outcomes creating an opportunity for 
otherwise childless couples to live their dream of parenthood.  However it has 
also been problematic, particularly where the surrogate mother fails to 
relinquish the child born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement. This 
article examines whether a surrogate mother, who is genetically related to 
the child she delivers, is less likely to relinquish the child than one who has 
no genetic ties.  An examination of empirical evidence provides support for 
this argument. Legislation and case law in Australia, the United States and 
the United Kingdom, is examined to determine which, if any, of these 
jurisdictions take into account the existence, or otherwise, of a genetic link 
between the surrogate mother and the child she bears. The article concludes 
that surrogacy legislation should, subject to exceptional circumstances, 
encourage surrogacy arrangements where the child and the surrogate are not 
genetically related.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
‘Through technology we have separated sex and reproduction.’1 
The concept of surrogacy dates back to biblical times when the infertile Sarah 
gave her servant Hagar to her husband Abraham so that a child could be 
conceived and born to them. According to the bible the conception was successful 
and a son, Ishmael, was born. When relations between the parties deteriorated 
                                                 
1 Sandra S. Tangri and Janet R. Kahn, 'Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies: 
Perspectives from Feminism and the Psychology Profession' (1993) 24(3) Professional Psychology: 
Research and Practice 271. 
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Sarah banished Hagar and her “son”.2  Sarah, Hagar and Abraham had effectively 
entered into a surrogacy arrangement.3 Hagar was inseminated with Abraham’s 
sperm so that the resulting child was genetically related to his father, Abraham, 
and the surrogate, Hagar but not to Sarah, the commissioning mother. 
 
Medicine has advanced significantly since the days of Sarah and Abraham and the 
options for infertile couples continue to grow. However, if a woman cannot gestate a 
foetus, she cannot produce a child, even if her gametes are healthy. Medical science has 
not created an artificial womb. Surrogacy offers a chance for infertile couples to have a 
child where other forms of assisted reproductive technology have failed, or will do so, 
and adoption is not an option.4  
 
This article examines whether a surrogate mother, who is genetically related to the child 
she delivers, is more likely to have difficulty relinquishing the child to the commissioning 
parents than a surrogate who has no genetic ties to the child, and the legal implications 
which do or should flow from such a finding.  
 
The first part of the article examines empirical evidence to determine whether this 
proposition is supported. In the second part case law from Australia, the United States 
and the United Kingdom is considered in an endeavour to determine whether more 
relinquishment issues occur where the surrogate and the child born as a result of the 
surrogacy agreement are genetically linked. The courts’ attitude towards dealing with 
disputes involving a failure by the surrogate mother to relinquish the child, and in 
particular, whether or not the courts place relevance on a genetic link in making this 
                                                 
2 The Holy Bible King James Version 2000 Genesis 16, http://www.bartleby.com/108/01/16.html at 17 
January 2010. 
3 Biblical references concern slaves who would have had no choice whether or not to enter into the 
surrogacy arrangement. A. Stumke, ‘Looking backwards, looking forwards: Judicial and Legislative 
Trends in the Regulation of Surrogate Motherhood in the UK and Australia’ (2004) 18 AJFL 13fn 2, 
refers to M Freedman, ‘Does Surrogacy Have a Future after Brazier’ (1999) 7 MLR 1fn 2. 
4 One British fertility survey indicated the main reasons couples require surrogacy are – congenital absence 
or surgical removal of the uterus with intact ovaries, medical conditions preventing pregnancy and 
recurrent implantation failure after IVF. Adam Balen and Catherine Hayden, ‘British Fertility Society 
Survey of all Licensed Clinics that Perform Surrogacy in the UK’ (1998) 1 Human Fertility 6. 
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determination is also examined. After examining the empirical evidence and the case law, 
the writer concludes that there is a greater likelihood of failure by the surrogate mother to 
relinquish the child when the surrogate and the child are genetically related.  
 
The final part of this article examines legislation is Australia, the United States and the 
United Kingdom to determine whether it takes into account and reflects the 
considerations raised by the empirical evidence and case law. Specifically, the article 
questions whether the legislation has distinguished between partial and gestational 
surrogacy.   
 
The writer concludes that legislation dealing with surrogacy should discourage 
arrangements where the surrogate’s gametes are used in the creation of an embryo. If the 
commissioning mother is unable to supply oocytes, donated eggs should be used. The 
surrogate mother’s eggs should only be considered as a last resort and subject to very 
strict guidelines in terms of counselling and medical support.  
 
A surrogacy arrangement can be one of two kinds – a gestational surrogacy or a partial 
surrogacy. In a gestational or full surrogacy arrangement the surrogate mother has no 
genetic link to the child. This may occur through the creation of an embryo from the 
commissioning parents’ sperm and ovum which is implanted into the uterus of the 
surrogate mother. The resulting child is biologically related to the commissioning parents 
but has no genetic ties to the surrogate mother. A gestational surrogacy may also be 
created by fertilising a donor egg with the commissioning father’s sperm, or donor sperm. 
The embryo is implanted into the surrogate mother’s uterus and, again, the child will not 
be genetically linked to the surrogate. The important feature about gestational surrogacy 
is that the surrogate mother’s gametes are not used in the fertilization process. 
 
In a partial surrogacy the surrogate is inseminated with sperm taken from the 
commissioning father or donated sperm. This usually occurs artificially. The surrogate’s 
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own egg is fertilized and, as a consequence, there is a genetic link between the surrogate 
mother and the child she bears.5  
 
Throughout this paper the term “surrogate” is used when referring to the surrogate 
mother.6  A surrogate involved in a partial surrogacy arrangement is referred to as the 
genetic surrogate, and in a gestational surrogacy arrangement as the gestational surrogate. 
The couple seeking assistance from the surrogate is referred to as the commissioning 
couple, commissioning mother or commissioning father, depending on the context. 
A surrogacy arrangement impacts on the parties to that arrangement in different 
ways. Different insights are gained or lost depending on the type of arrangement 
and whose perspective is being examined. Commissioning mothers can gain a 
biologically related child through IVF procedures, or a child that is unrelated 
through donated insemination.  Surrogate mothers can relinquish a biologically 
related child through donated insemination or one that is unrelated by use of IVF 
procedures. 7  
The focus of this paper is on the second of these perspectives; that is the issue of 
relinquishment by the surrogate mother. 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Some important studies have been carried out on surrogates involved in both 
partial and gestational surrogacy arrangements. While there is no clear evidence 
to suggest a greater failure to relinquish in genetic surrogates, the research does 
make some interesting findings about the feelings and attitudes of the parties 
                                                 
5 Imogen Gold, ‘Surrogacy: Is there a case for legal prohibition?’ (2004) 12 JLM 205.  
6 No offence is intended by this reference. It simply obviates repeated use of the word mother while making 
a clear distinction between the surrogate mother and the commissioning mother. 
7 Olga van den Akker, ‘A Longitudinal Pre-pregnancy to Post-delivery Comparison of Genetic and 
Gestational Surrogate and Intended Mothers: Confidence and Genealogy’ (2005) 26(4) Journal of 
Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gynaecology 277, 278. 
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involved in the arrangement.8 In addition, there is evidence that those parties 
concerned with the surrogacy arrangement other than the surrogate and the 
commissioning parents, show a preference towards gestational surrogacy. 
One study examined the feelings and attitudes of 24 surrogates and their partners. 
Sixteen surrogates did not think a genetic link between the surrogate and the child 
born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement was important, while eight believed 
a genetic link was relevant.9 Fear of relinquishment was reported as a concern by 
some genetic surrogates.  The partners of those surrogates were concerned about 
the surrogate wanting to keep the child and how their existing children would feel 
towards the child born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement.10 By contrast, the 
main concern for gestational surrogates was that the treatment would fail or that 
the commissioning mother would not adopt the child.11 There was some evidence 
of weepiness and regret at not having interacted with the baby from genetic 
mothers following relinquishment of the child. Comments from gestational 
surrogates were all of a positive nature. 12 This indicates definite awareness of the 
genetic difference between partial and gestational surrogacy arrangements and 
reveals feelings of fear, disappointment and concern among those with a 
connection to a partial surrogacy arrangement.  
Studies have also shown that surrogates will place themselves in a position 
suitable to their values and beliefs.13 By focusing on the elements of motherhood 
they don’t possess, the surrogate reduces ‘connection’ to the child. Genetic 
surrogates focus on the importance of social motherhood, rather than the genetic 
aspects.  Likewise a gestational surrogate will place emphasis on the genetic 
aspects of motherhood to reduce feelings of attachment to the baby. She does this 
                                                 
8 Olga van den Akker, Genetic and Gestational Surrogate Mothers’ Experience of Surrogacy (2003) 21(2) 
Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology 145. 
9  Van den Akker n 8, 151. 
10 Van den Akker n 8, 152. 
11 Van den Akker n 8, 152. 
12 Van den Akker n 8, 157. 
13 Janice C Ciccarelli, Linda J Beckman,  ‘Navigating Rough Waters: An Overview of Psychological 
Aspects of Surrogacy’ (2005) 61(1) Journal of Social Issues 21, 43,  Olga van den Akker, ‘A 
Longitudinal Pre-pregnancy to Post-delivery Comparison of Genetic and Gestational Surrogate and 
Intended Mothers’  above n 7,  282. 
6 
 
because it is lacking in her pregnancy.14 This process, known as cognitive 
restructuring, enables the surrogate to select the type of arrangement which agrees 
with her values and adjust her thinking sufficiently to accommodate that 
arrangement. 
Counselling can play a significant role in the success or otherwise of the 
surrogacy arrangement.15  There has been an increased awareness of the ‘need for 
psychological support and counselling for involuntarily childless couples.’16  Due 
to the medical procedures involved, a gestational surrogacy cannot take place 
without the involvement of health professionals. It is likely that counselling will 
automatically be provided as part of the service for assisted reproductive 
technology.  On the other hand, artificial insemination can occur outside the 
parameters of the health care environment if the parties concerned have the 
knowledge and determination.17  Counselling may not be sought. Edelmann 
suggests a lack of counselling coupled with a genetic link to the child ‘may 
increase the risk of problems which could have been aired had mental health 
professionals been involved.’18 
According to one survey ‘most clinics that perform surrogacy perform IVF 
surrogacy. Very few perform straight surrogacy with the insemination of 
spermatozoa into the surrogate host.’19 Therefore, unless the surrogate’s gametes 
are used in the IVF process (as opposed to those of the commissioning mother or 
a donor) the result will be a gestational surrogacy arrangement. Comments taken 
from one survey include: 
                                                 
14 Van den Akker, ‘Genetic and Gestational Surrogate Mothers’ Experience of Surrogacy’, above  n 8, 157. 
Note also van den Akker, ‘A longitudinal Pre-pregnancy to post-delivery Comparison of Genetic and 
Gestational Surrogate and Intended Mothers’  above n 7, 283 found that gestational mothers were more 
likely than genetic mothers to agree that it is easier for a surrogate to relinquish a non-genetic baby.  
Few genetic surrogates believed it was easier to accept or relinquish a genetic baby.  Both gestational 
and genetic surrogates showed cognitive restructuring appropriate to their surrogacy arrangement.   
15 Ciccarelli et al, n 13, 34. 
16 R.J. Edelmann, ‘Surrogacy: the Psychological Issues’ (2004) 22(2) Journal of Reproductive and Infant 
Psychology 123, 132. 
17 As an example see Turchyn v Cornelius (1999) Ohio App. LEXIS 4129. 
18 Edelmann  n 16, 125. 
19 Balen et al, n 4, 6. Monash IVF will not support partial surrogacy, refer Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Council, 4th December 2008, 5445, Jenny Mikakos. 
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 ‘One clinic could not see why licensed clinics should get involved in 
straight surrogacy arrangements.’20 
 ‘One clinic was totally opposed to straight surrogacy and suggested that 
every effort should be made to facilitate egg donation to reduce the 
demand for this.’21 
 ‘Most felt that patients with congenital absence of the uterus or previous 
hysterectomy should be offered IVF surrogacy but not straight  
surrogacy.’22 
Sydney IVF and the Canberra Fertility Clinic are two prominent fertility 
clinics in Australia which provide surrogacy services and whose policies only 
support gestational surrogacy arrangements.23 This practice is shared by the 
Western Australian Reproductive Technology Council and the South 
Australian Council on Reproductive Technology.24  The Australian Medical 
Association (Queensland) and the Queensland Fertility Group ‘believe partial 
surrogacy should be limited to situations where the birth mother was either a 
sister or a mother of the intending parents.’25  
‘In partial surrogacy where there is not a genetic relationship between commissioning parents 
and gestational parent, the gestational carrier has a legitimate and complicating genetic claim 
on the child after delivery.’26  
Analysis of the empirical evidence 
Whilst the empirical evidence does not establish a direct correlation between 
partial surrogacy and failure to relinquish the child born as a result of the 
                                                 
20 Balen et al, n 4, 6. Straight surrogacy arrangements occur where the surrogate is artificially inseminated, 
thereby using her ovum in the fertilisation process. 
21 Balen et al, n 4, 6. 
22 Balen et al, n 4, 9. 
23 Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy, Final Report, 2008, Chapter 4, 45.  
24 Queensland, Investigation into altruistic Surrogacy, Final Report, 2008, Chapter 4, 47. 
25 Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy, Final Report, 2008, Chapter 4, 47. 
26 Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy, Final Report, 2008, Chapter 4, 47. 
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surrogacy arrangement, the writer submits there are some telling findings which 
emanate from the studies. The process of cognitive restructuring suggests that the 
genetic surrogate is placed in a more vulnerable position than the gestational 
surrogate. The gestational surrogate makes a single contribution to motherhood 
and that is to carry the child to the point of delivery, after which she should 
surrender the child to the commissioning parents.  By focusing on the two aspects 
of pregnancy she lacks – a genetic connection and the prospect of being the social 
mother – she can detach herself from the child, thereby making relinquishment 
easier.  On the other hand, the genetic surrogate makes two contributions to 
motherhood – her genetic makeup and her ability to carry the child to term. Hence 
the genetic surrogate has two hurdles to overcome in her cognitive restructuring: 
that of her biological attachment and her role as the delivering mother. The only 
aspect of pregnancy she lacks and the only tool she has to detach from the 
pregnancy is her lack of social motherhood. It is submitted, therefore, that her job 
is more difficult. 
The attitudes of and approaches which fertility clinics take towards surrogacy is 
relevant and consistent with the author’s concerns about genetic surrogates. 
Surrogacy arrangements should be carried out within the confines of these 
organizations where appropriate health screening and counselling can be provided 
for the protection of all parties concerned.27  Surveys indicate that clinics may 
prefer to be involved with surrogacy arrangements which engage IVF techniques.  
This would occur in gestational surrogacy arrangements rather than those of a 
partial nature.28 
Finally the feelings and attitudes of those indirectly involved in the surrogacy 
arrangement are important to the success of the surrogacy.  If the surrogate’s 
partner or existing family members harbour feelings of hostility or concern 
towards  the arrangement it will create tension between the parties. This is not 
conducive to the smooth running and finalisation of the surrogacy arrangement 
                                                 
27 Balen et al n 4, 9. 
28 The exception would be where the surrogate’s ovum is used in an IVF procedure.  
9 
 
and should be avoided where possible.  The empirical evidence suggests these 
negative feelings are reduced in gestational surrogacy arrangements. 
  
CASE LAW  
A study of relevant case law reveals a slight trend towards refusal by genetic 
surrogates to relinquish the child born as a result of a surrogacy arrangement.  
This article reviews publicly available cases involving relinquishment disputes in 
surrogacy arrangements in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom.    
(I) Australian Case Law 
There is limited Australian case law which has arisen because of a dispute 
consequent upon a surrogate being unwilling to relinquish the child born as a 
result of a surrogacy arrangement. Most surrogacy matters involve applications to 
the court for adoption or parenting orders.29 Since 2007 there has been a 
significant increase in the number of surrogacy cases reported in Australia.30 The 
increase is due to a number of possible factors. First, surrogacy has received 
considerable publicity over the past few years so more people are aware of this 
reproductive option.  Second, reproductive techniques have improved 
significantly. Finally, within the Australian jurisdiction, legislation in many states 
has undergone reform. This third point is discussed in the final part of the article.  
At this point it is sufficient to note the path to parenthood for commissioning 
parents has been made easier in some jurisdictions. 31  
                                                 
29 W: Re Adoption (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Adoption Division, Windeyer J, 22 
June, 6 July 1998),  Re A and B (2000) 26 Fam L R 317,  Re D and E (2000) 26 Fam L R 310, Rusken 
and Jenner [2009] Fam CA 282 (unreported, Bell J, 13 March 2009). 
30 Of 13 reported cases concerning surrogacy arrangements, 6 have occurred within the last three years.  
31 In recent years New South Wales and Western Australia have enacted legislation pertaining to surrogacy 
and all states except Tasmania have amended surrogacy legislation. In the Australian Capital Territory, 
Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia parentage orders can be made. The Northern Territory 
still has no legislation pertaining to surrogacy.  
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However, this path is severely obstructed where the surrogacy arrangement is not 
fulfilled successfully, due to failure by the surrogate to relinquish the child. The 
lives of the parties concerned can be placed in turmoil.  Failure to relinquish leads 
to an adverse result and one which must be avoided to protect the interests of the 
child born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement. Accordingly this article 
examines only those cases involving disputes over relinquishment failure rather 
than those where the parties have achieved a successful surrogacy arrangement.  
The sad and traumatic case of Re Evelyn32 did not resolve itself without heartache.  
The case concerned a partial surrogacy, the birth mother having been inseminated 
with the commissioning father’s sperm. An emotional tug of war erupted between 
the parties resulting in a court order that the child, Evelyn, reside with the birth 
mother and her family.  
Initially the surrogate mother had relinquished the baby to the commissioning 
parents.  However in the months following Evelyn’s birth she struggled with her 
decision to give up the child and sought grief counselling before reclaiming her 
daughter.  The biological connection between Evelyn and her surrogate mother 
was a matter the trial judge took into consideration when awarding custody to the 
surrogate. On appeal, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia noted ‘there 
was no presumption in favour of a biological parent.’33 The paramount 
consideration was the ‘best interests of the child’34 although the genetic link 
between the child and the surrogate mother’s existing children was not irrelevant.  
However, the court agreed with the trial judge that, taking all considerations into 
account, it was in the best interests of Evelyn that she be placed in the care of her 
biological mother and step siblings.35  
                                                 
32 (1998) 23 Fam LR 53. 
33 (1998) 23 Fam LR 53, 70. 
34 (1998) 23 Fam LR 53, 71. 
35 Margaret Otlowski ‘The Law of Surrogacy in Australia and some issues arising out of Re Evelyn’ (1998) 
4 CFL 264 notes that this approach could suggest the biological mother would succeed in a custody 
application in respect of an infant surrogate child save for exceptional circumstances.  However she 
qualifies this by noting this is not a presumption and each case will be determined on its own facts.  
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The only other Australian case concerning a dispute over relinquishment arising 
between the surrogate and the commissioning parents occurred in 2009.36  The 
surrogacy arrangement was formed and completed in South Africa with the 
surrogate initially relinquishing the child.  The commissioning parents moved to 
Australia and subsequently separated acrimoniously. The case primarily 
concerned a custody battle between the commissioning parents over the male 
child born as a result of the surrogacy agreement.  The surrogate became involved 
as an ‘intervenor’37in the dispute. However her application for custody of the 
child was dismissed because the child had spent the first seven years of his life 
with either or both commissioning parents. It was unclear whether the biological 
mother was the surrogate or the commissioning mother in this case.38 It is relevant 
that both thought they were genetically related to the child and both sought 
custody.  
A study of surrogacy case law in the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom provides a further foundation to support the writer’s submission that 
gestational surrogacy should be favoured over a partial surrogacy arrangement. 
 
(2)  United States Case Law 
Like Australia, the USA does not have uniform surrogacy laws.   Surrogacy is 
regulated by statute in some states including Texas, Florida, Tennessee and 
Arizona.39 Some jurisdictions, such as North and South Carolina, Georgia and 
                                                 
36 Rusken & Jenner [2009] Fam CA 282 (Unreported, Bell J, 13 March 2009). 
37 An ‘intervenor’ is a person who intervenes as a party in the proceedings to protect their interests where 
such interests differ from those of the existing parties to the dispute. Butterworths Concise Australian 
Legal Dictionary (1997) 216. 
38 Evidence was given by the commissioning mother to the effect that her eggs were placed in the 
surrogate.  However there was no medical evidence supporting this. The procedure took place in South 
Africa.  
39 These are examples only of the states which have legislation governing surrogacy.  In fact there are 11 
states in the USA which have statutory laws recognising surrogacy contracts. The writer does not intend 
to address all these states.  Even within the four states mentioned above, there is a marked difference in 
the level of regulation. See Nakash & Herdiman, ‘Surrogacy’ (2007) 27(3) Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology 246, 247. 
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Maryland rely on paternity rights and adoption laws to secure surrogacy 
arrangements.  Other states such as California, Ohio and New Jersey have 
examined the issue through case law.40  The three last mentioned jurisdictions are 
examined in this part.  These jurisdictions have been selected to illustrate the 
different approaches taken to surrogacy by the courts in the United States. Not 
only is the approach different between each jurisdiction, but this inconsistency is 
present within each individual state.   Four legal proceedings surrounding the case 
of Rice v Flynn 41illustrates how destructive an unsuccessful surrogacy 
arrangement can be to all parties concerned, particularly to the children born as a 
result of the agreement. 
California is relatively favourable as a legal forum for surrogacy arrangements.42 
The courts will generally extend existing family law statutes to the specific 
surrogacy situation. To this extent a genetic connection to the child born as a 
result of the surrogacy arrangement can be relevant because genetic consanguinity 
is one way of proving motherhood under Californian law. If the legislation does 
not assist in resolving the matter the court is prepared to examine the surrogacy 
contract to determine the intention of the parties to the surrogacy agreement.  
In Johnson v Calvert43 a dispute arose between the gestational surrogate and the 
commissioning parents.  The question before the court was: 
“when, pursuant to a surrogacy agreement, a zygote formed of the gametes of a husband 
and wife is implanted in the uterus of another woman who carries the resulting fetus to 
term and gives birth to a child not genetically related to her, who is the child’s ‘natural 
mother’ under Californian law?”44 
                                                 
40  John Ciccarelli and Janice Ciccarelli, ‘The Legal Aspects of Parental Rights in Assisted Reproductive 
Technology’ (2005) 61(1) Journal of Social Issues 127 at 132. California extends existing family law 
statutes to surrogacy arrangements where possible. As can be seen from the cases studied, existing laws 
are not always applicable to the case being heard. 
41 2005 Ohio 4667. 
42 Pinkerton Thomas, ‘Surrogacy and Egg Donation Law in California’ (1998) The American Surrogacy 
Centre http://www.surrogacy.com/legals/article/calaw.html.  
43 5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993). 
44 5 Cal. 4th 84, 87 (1993) (Panelli J). 
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The surrogate claimed she was the natural mother by virtue of giving birth to the 
child.  The commissioning mother claimed parentage on the basis of the 
biological relationship she had with the child. The court concluded that the 
genetically linked commissioning mother was the natural mother because “she 
was the one who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to 
raise as her own.”45 The court looked to the intention of the parties as indicated by 
the surrogate agreement itself, to determine the child’s mother.  However this was 
because the relevant legislation46 provided a genetic consanguinity and giving 
birth were equally acceptable as proof of maternity.47  Because the commissioning 
mother was also the biological mother and, obviously the surrogate gave birth to 
the child, both women were able to prove maternity.  The court had to turn to the 
surrogate agreement to make its determination of motherhood.   
A year later in Re the Marriage of Moschetta,48 parental rights were vested in a 
surrogate mother genetically linked to the child and the genetically linked 
commissioning father. The surrogate had become pregnant by being artificially 
inseminated with the commissioning father’s sperm.  The court did not refer to the 
surrogacy contract to determine the parties’ intention because there was no 
ambiguity under the legislation. The genetic mother and the delivering mother 
were the same person – the surrogate mother – and therefore the legal mother 
according to Californian law.49  
However in Re the Marriage of John A and Luanne H Buzzanca,50 the Court of 
Appeal of California found that, just as an infertile husband who consents to 
artificial insemination of his wife is deemed to be the father of the child born to 
his wife51 so too should a married couple who consent to in vitro fertilization by  
                                                 
45 5 Cal. 4th 84, 93 (1993). 
46 The Uniform Parentage Act was a series of enactments introduced to abolish the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate children.  The legislation based parental and child rights on the relationship 
rather than marital status. Johnson v Calvert 5 Cal 4th 84, 89 (1993). 
47 Uniform Parentage Act, Civ. Code ss 7003(1), 7004 (a), 7015, Evid. Code, ss 621, 892. 
48 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218 (1994). 
49 CAL FAM CODE (Deering) (2009) S 7600. 
50 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (1998). 
51 CAL. FAM. CODE (Deering) (2009) S 7613. 
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unknown donors and subsequent implantation into a surrogate, be considered the 
parents of the child delivered.  The case involved a gestational surrogacy where 
the surrogate was implanted with an embryo created from donor egg and sperm.  
After the surrogate became pregnant but before the birth of the child, the 
commissioning couple filed for divorce.  The surrogate made no claim to the 
child.  The issue concerned child support and whether the commissioning parents 
were the child’s lawful parents. Neither were genetically related to the child 
(named Jaycee) nor was the surrogate mother.  The trial judge had concluded that 
the child had no legal parents because neither the surrogate nor the 
commissioning parents had a biological relationship with the child, nor had the 
child been adopted.  This finding was overruled on appeal.  The court found the 
Buzzancas (commissioning parents) were Jaycee’s lawful parents because the 
child “would not have been born had not the commissioning parents both agreed 
to have a fertilized egg implanted in a surrogate.”52Again the court looked at the 
intention of the parties. 
In some cases the behavior of the parties subsequent to performance of the 
surrogacy arrangement is relevant. In Adoption of Ian O, a Minor,53 a genetically 
related surrogate had her parental rights to the child terminated.  Issues of 
abandonment surrounded the court’s decision.  The facts of this case are unusual 
from the outset.  The commissioning father was a doctor.  He and his wife had 
failed to conceive so sought assistance from a surrogate. In order to save costs he 
carried out the procedure to artificially inseminate the surrogate using his own 
sperm.  A successful pregnancy was achieved and, in 1997, a child was born as a 
result of this surrogacy arrangement. . The surrogate initially relinquished the 
child to the biological father (and his wife). When the child was three months old, 
in response to the commissioning father’s paternity application, the surrogate 
requested joint legal custody and visitation rights. Various legal proceedings 
ensued until the surrogate’s parental rights were terminated in 2004.  During this 
                                                 
52 In re the Marriage of Buzzanca 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1412 (1998). 
53 Cal. App. Unpub. Lexis 11727 (2004). 
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time the surrogate had not visited or supported the child in any way.54 Pursuant to 
the Californian Family Code a proceeding to free a child from the parents’ 
custody and control can be brought where the child has been left for one year 
without any provision for the child’s support, or without communication from the 
parent.55 Clearly the behavior of the surrogate after the birth of the child played a 
significant role in the court’s determination as to parentage.  
Californian courts have used legislation other than the Family Law Code to 
resolve surrogacy disputes. In Adoption of Matthew B, a Minor56 a surrogate 
mother, genetically related to the child, initially signed a release authorizing the 
commissioning couple to take the child home.  She consented to a judgment 
establishing the commissioning father’s paternity and to the commissioning 
mother’s stepparent adoption. The relationship between the surrogate and the 
commissioning couple deteriorated and the surrogate subsequently sought to 
withdraw her consent to the adoption and to vacate the paternity judgment.    The 
court denied both petitions on the basis of the child’s best interests. The court was 
required, at the time,57 to draw on sections of the Californian Civil Code to 
address the issues.58 
A study of the published case law in California indicates the courts are flexible in 
their approach to surrogacy.  Existing statutes are utilized where they are relevant 
and applicable. The family law statutes resolve parenthood in favour of the 
biological mother and the delivering mother, but other statutes will be utilized if 
they are relevant.  The courts are also prepared to examine the surrogacy 
agreement if necessary and, in some cases, look at the subsequent behavior of the 
parties to make a determination.  
                                                 
54 This was partly due to the fact she had spent three years in prison for soliciting another to murder her ex-
husband. 
55 CAL FAM CODE (Deering) (2009) S 7822. 
56 Adoption of Matthew B, a minor 232 Cal. App. 3rd 1239 (1991). 
57 This part of the civil code has now been amended to become part of the California Family Code. 
58 CAL CIVIL CODE SS 7005, 7006, 226a.  
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The Ohio judiciary places a greater emphasis on genetic connection. The 
biological commissioning parents of a child delivered by a gestational surrogate 
are the individuals who provided the genetic imprint for that child and therefore 
the child’s parents.59 In Belsito v Clark 60 the Court of Common Pleas disregarded 
the test of the parties’ intention to bring about the birth of and raise the child, as 
decided in the Californian case of Johnson v Calvert.61 The court noted that a rule 
the genetic parents are the legal parents is easier to apply than an intention test, 
given the certainly of DNA blood testing.62 It even went so far as to state that a 
gestational surrogate can only become the legal parent of the child she has 
delivered with the consent or waiver of parental rights by the genetic parents.63 
The test espoused by the court in Belsito v Clark 64 was confirmed in Rice v 
Flynn65 which concerned a gestational surrogate impregnated with an embryo 
formed by the fertilization of a donated egg with the commissioning father’s 
sperm.  A custody battle over the resultant triplets ensued between the surrogate, 
the egg donor, the commissioning father and his female partner.  Five separate 
legal actions followed.  The matter was further complicated by the fact the 
hearings were in two jurisdictions – Ohio and Pennsylvania.  Initially Mr Flynn, 
the biological father of the triplets, sued in Pennsylvania to recover the children 
from the surrogate and establish his right to sole custody.  Despite finding that the 
surrogacy contract was void, the court held Mr Flynn was the legal father as 
designated by the contract.  It further held that, because no legal mother was 
provided for in the contract that status should be afforded to Mrs Bimber, the 
surrogate mother, because she had assumed parental duties and responsibilities.66 
The following year the egg-donor, Ms Rice, sued in Ohio to establish that she was 
the legal mother of the children. The court ruled that Mr Flynn and Ms Rice were 
                                                 
59 Belsito v Clark 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 58 (1994). 
60 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (1994). 
61 5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993). 
62 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 65 (1994).  
63 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 65 (1994). 
64 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 65 (1994). 
65 2005 Ohio 4667. 
66 J.F. v D.B. 66 Pa D & C 4th 1 (2004). 
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the parents under Ohio law as they provided the genetic imprint for the children.67 
In the third legal proceedings the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas awarded 
primary custody of the triplets to the surrogate and ordered Mr Flynn pay child 
support.68 The fourth proceeding was held in Ohio and this time the court placed a 
greater emphasis on the surrogacy contract which had been held void in previous 
proceedings.69  Finally the matter reached the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in 
200670 where it concluded that the biological father was entitled to custody of his 
children over the gestational surrogate who had no biological connection to the 
triplets.  The order of the trial court regarding custody was vacated.  The court 
noted that the law of Pennsylvania ‘provides that persons other than a child’s 
biological or natural parents are “third parties” for the purposes of custody 
disputes.’71 Further the “natural parent has a prima facie right to custody which 
will be forfeited only if clear and convincing reasons appear that the child’s best 
interest will be served by an award to the third party.”72 
The importance of the genetic link in establishing parentage in Ohio had been 
applied some years earlier in the case of Turchyn v Cornelius.73 The 
commissioning parents, the surrogate and the surrogate’s husband were friends.  
They entered into an arrangement whereby the surrogate would be artificially 
inseminated with the commissioning father’s sperm.  This procedure was carried 
out at the home of one of the parties’ to the agreement. No medical professionals 
were involved. The surrogate’s services were to be purely gratuitous.  However 
the surrogacy agreement contained a provision that allowed the surrogate to keep 
the child provided she advised the commissioning parents of the decision prior to 
the birth of the child.  The surrogate and her husband decided they wished to 
retain custody of the child and informed the commissioning parents in accordance 
with the agreement. The commissioning and biological father of the child 
                                                 
67 The court followed Belsito v Clark 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (1994). 
68 Flynn v Bimber 70 Pa D & C 4th 261(2005) referred to in J.F. v D.B. 165 Ohio App. 3d 791, 795(2006). 
69 J.F. v D.B 165 Ohio App 3d 791 (2006). 
70 J.F. v D.B. 2006 Pa Super 90 [38]. 
71 J.F. v D.B. 2006 Pa Super 90[26]. 
72 J.F. v D.B. 2006 Pa Super 90 [26], referred to Jones v Jones 2005 PA Super 337. 
73 (1999) Ohio A. LEXIS 4129. 
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requested the court order genetic testing to determine whether he could establish 
parentage. The surrogate objected. Subsequently the commissioning and 
biological father filed a motion to dismiss his application on the basis of a desire 
to spare the child the difficulties associated with dividing time between the two 
families.  The court found it was in the child’s best interest to continue the 
paternity action, despite the fact the person who sought to dismiss the action was 
the same person who initiated it, that is, the commissioning and biological father.  
The court noted it was in the child’s interest to have certainty surrounding his 
biological heritage.  In addition, the child was entitled to his natural father’s care 
and guidance.  
A study of the published case law in Ohio indicates this jurisdiction places 
significance on genetic consanguinity, rather than the content of the surrogacy 
agreement, in making a determination of parentage.  
“As a matter of public policy Ohio will not enforce or encourage private agreements or contracts 
to give up parental rights.”74 
Perhaps the most famous surrogacy case in the USA where the surrogate failed to 
relinquish the child is that of “Baby M”.75 In that case the New Jersey court had to 
determine the validity of a contract whereby the surrogate was artificially 
inseminated with the commissioning father’s sperm.  The intent of the contract 
was that, following delivery of the child, the surrogate would sever all contact 
with the child, who would then be adopted by the commissioning mother so that 
both commissioning parents would be regarded as the child’s parents.  Following 
the birth of the child, the surrogate (Mrs Whitehead) had difficulty relinquishing 
the child, and a battle over the custody of Baby M ensued.  
                                                 
74 Belsito v Clark  67 Ohio Misc. 2d  54 (1994)  referred to in Decker v Decker Ohio App. LEXIS 4839 
(2001) [10]. 
75 In the Matter of Baby M, A Pseudonym for an actual person 109 N.J. 396 (1988). 
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“Mrs Whitehead realized, almost from the moment of birth that she could not part with this child.  
She had felt a bond with it even during pregnancy…She talked about how the baby looked like her 
other daughter, and made it clear that she was experiencing great difficulty with the decision.”76 
The trial judge found that the surrogacy contract was valid and ordered the 
surrogate’s parental rights be terminated.  Sole custody was granted to the 
commissioning parents.  
Interestingly the trial judge also concluded that the statutes which governed the 
matter concerning adoption, termination of parental rights and payment of money 
in connection with adoptions were irrelevant to a surrogacy arrangement because 
the legislature did not have surrogacy in mind when the relevant statutes were 
passed.77 However the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the surrogacy 
contract was invalid because it conflicted with those existing statutes and the 
public policies of New Jersey.  It held the surrogate mother was the child’s legal 
mother. Custody was awarded to the biological father with the matter of visitation 
rights being remanded to the lower court for determination. 
Twelve years later the Superior Court of New Jersey refused to issue a pre-birth 
order directing a delivering physician to list the couple who provided an embryo 
carried by a surrogate, as legal parents on a child’s birth certificate, because it was 
contrary to the existing law.78 Voluntary surrenders79 are not allowed within 
seventy-two hours of the birth of a child in New Jersey.80 However the court 
noted that a gestational surrogate could surrender the child seventy-two hours 
after giving birth which is two days before the original birth certificate has to be 
prepared.  Provided the surrogate relinquishes her parental rights the biological 
parents could still be listed as the legal parents on the original birth certificate. 
The issue of relinquishment holds the key to success of the arrangement.  
                                                 
76 In the Matter of Baby M, A Pseudonym for an actual person 109 N.J. 396, 414 (1988). 
77 In the Matter of Baby M, A Pseudonym for an actual person 109 N.J. 396, 414 (1988). 
78 AHW v GHB 339 N.J. Super 495 (2000). 
79  A voluntary surrender is a signed instrument relinquishing parental rights and guardianship or custody 
rights to the child named in the instrument.  See N.J. STAT ANN S 9:3–41(a). 
80 N.J. STAT ANN S 9:3-41(e). 
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New Jersey does not determine parentage according to genetic connection.  
Existing statute law is applied to the surrogacy arrangement where possible. The 
New Jersey judiciary treats surrogacy contracts as invalid.  
Emerging Trends 
In California, the courts follow legislation, where it assists, to determine 
maternity.  Where the legislation does not provide a solution to the particular 
circumstances, such as where the genetic mother and the delivering mother are 
not the same person, the court looks to the intention of the parties.  In three of the 
five cases concerning a dispute over relinquishment, the surrogate had a genetic 
link with the child. 
 The states of Ohio and Pennsylvania favour the genetic parent in custody 
disputes.  However both the cases studied in these states concerned disputes 
arising from gestational surrogacies. New Jersey, like California, adapts existing 
legislation to the surrogacy situation. However, unlike California, New Jersey will 
not rely on the surrogate contract to assist its decision making.  
 U.S.A. state courts and legal scholars have developed four models for 
determining maternity in gestational surrogacy arrangements.81  These include the 
intent based theory,82 genetic contribution theory,83 gestational mother preference 
theory84 and the best interests of the child test.85 
Whilst the genetic contribution theory is not the only test used by the courts, in 
some states it plays a significant role.   
The United States’ judiciary has not been consistent in its approach to dealing 
with disputes involving failure to relinquish a child born as a result of a surrogacy 
                                                 
81 J.F. v D.B. 165 Ohio App. 3rd 791, 794 (2006). 
82 This theory has been adopted in the states of California, Nevada and New York. See Johnson v Calvert 5 
Cal. 4th 84 (1993). 
83 This theory has been adopted in the state of Ohio. See Belsito v Clark 76 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (1994). 
84 This theory has been adopted in Arizona. See ARIZ REV STAT 25-218. 
85 This test has been adopted in Michigan and Utah as noted in J.F. v D.B. 2004 Pa D & C. 4th 1, 38 (2004). 
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arrangement.86 The Baby M 87 case and Rice v Flynn 88 indicate how disruptive 
and emotionally disturbing such inconsistency can be on the child or children 
born as a result of a surrogacy arrangement. Decisions have varied from state to 
state depending on whether there is any legislation that can be applied to a 
surrogacy arrangement even if not drafted for that purpose.  Some states place 
emphasis on a genetic link.  One reason for this is the clear and final outcome it 
can provide with the assistance of DNA testing. Other states are prepared to look 
at the surrogacy contract itself and the intention of the parties.  
Surrogacy case law in the United Kingdom has a thread of consistency which is 
not apparent in the United States. 
 
3. United Kingdom Case Law 
Case law suggests that relinquishment disputes between the surrogate and the 
commissioning parents in the United Kingdom are more frequent where the 
surrogate is genetically linked to the child.  Of five cases published where 
surrogates have refused to relinquish the child89 only one involved a gestational 
surrogacy.90 In the remaining four cases, the surrogate was genetically linked to 
the child.  
In some instances the surrogate initially relinquished the child to the 
commissioning parents, but refused consent when adoption proceedings were 
subsequently instituted.  Often there had been a breakdown of relations between 
                                                 
86 To some extent this is due to legislation not being uniform and whether or not the court could apply 
existing legislation not specifically drafted with surrogacy in mind, to the situation at hand. 
87 In the Matter of Baby M, A Pseudonym for an actual person, 109 N.J. 396 (1998). 
88 2005 Ohio 4667. 
89 Re P (Minors) [1987] 2 FLR 421, Re MW [1995] 2 FLR 7159, C and C [1997] Fam Law 226, W and W v 
H [2002] 2 FLR 252, Re P (Surrogacy: Residence) [2008] 1 FLR 177. 
90 W and W v H [2002] 2 FLR 252.  Although this case involved a dispute over relinquishment, the court 
ordered the matter be heard in California as that was where the surrogacy contract was formed, where 
the procedure took place and where previous court proceedings has been instituted.  
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the parties to the surrogacy arrangement. In Re: MW (Adoption: Surrogacy) 91 the 
surrogate initially relinquished the child but refused to consent to an adoption 
application sought by the commissioning parents two and a half years later.  
Conflict had developed between the commissioning parents and the surrogate. 
Essentially the surrogate regretted her decision to enter into the surrogacy 
arrangement and sought care of the child. Adoption legislation92 required the 
court to have regard to the safeguard and welfare of the child. The court found 
that requiring the child to be removed from the family environment in which he 
had been placed for two and a half years to that of the surrogate would be of 
benefit to the surrogate and her existing daughter, but not to the child born as a 
result of the surrogacy arrangement who was the subject of the proceedings.  The 
adoption order was made in favour of the commissioning parents.  
Two years later the court found a genetic surrogate, who had relinquished the 
child to the commissioning parents at birth, but subsequently regretted her 
decision, was unreasonably withholding consent to an adoption order by the 
commissioning parents.93 The surrogate’s actions were not safeguarding and 
promoting the welfare of the child. An adoption order was granted in favour of 
the commissioning parents, despite contravention of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990, by payment of money in exchange for surrogacy 
services.94  The child’s welfare outweighed any issues of public policy that might 
arise concerning the financial payments made to the surrogate by the 
commissioning parents. 
In the United Kingdom, the court is required to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages that each party to the surrogacy arrangement can provide to the 
child, when determining parental rights. It will not enforce the surrogacy 
agreement.  However the surrounding circumstances may be relevant to the 
                                                 
91 [1995] 2 FLR 759. 
92 Adoption Act 1976 (UK). 
93 C and C [1997] Fam Law 226. 
94 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 30 (7). 
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court’s determination of whether the potential custodians are fit to care for the 
child.95   
This balancing act was put to the test in Re P (Minors).96 The surrogate was 
artificially inseminated with the commissioning father’s sperm resulting in the 
birth of twins which the surrogate failed to relinquish.  Against a background of 
twins who had resided with their biological mother for the first five months of 
life, the Court had to balance the advantages which the commissioning parents 
could offer.  Without any negative parenting behavior by the surrogate, it was a 
difficult scale for the commissioning parents to tip.  Whilst factors such as 
affluence, intellect, cultural and religious support may be advantageous, they were 
not sufficient to outweigh the bond between the surrogate and her biological 
children. 
On the other hand, in Re P (Surrogacy: Residence)97 the commissioning parents 
made an application for an order allowing the child, born as a result of the 
surrogacy arrangement, to reside with them. The court noted the surrogate had 
breached the agreement by incorrectly advising the commissioning couple that 
she had miscarried and no child would therefore be born as a result of the 
arrangement. This was untrue. The court concluded that the surrogate (Mrs P) set 
out to trick the couple with no intention of carrying the surrogacy arrangement 
through.  Mrs P’s partner had undergone an irreversible vasectomy. The couple 
wanted to have children but was disqualified from seeking fertility treatment by 
donor insemination on social and medical grounds. Surrogacy was a way in which 
Mrs P could be artificially inseminated for the purpose of acquiring another 
child.98 This, and other unusual behaviour by the surrogate, helped form the 
unfavourable view the judge held towards the medium and long-term future of the 
child if he resided with the surrogate and her family. Consequently, the judge 
ordered the child reside with his commissioning parents. 
                                                 
95 Re P (Minors) [1987] 2 FLR 421. 
96 Re P (Minors) [1987] 2 FLR 421. 
97 [2008] 1 FLR 177. 
98 [2008] 1 FLR 177 [55]. 
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In the UK, legislation providing for adoption or parenting orders requires the 
welfare of the child to be the paramount consideration. Suitability of the custodial 
parent is of primary importance. For this reason the courts look at pre-contractual 
and post-contractual behavior, and the advantages and disadvantages each party 
will provide to the child born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement. 
The United Kingdom does appear more consistent in its approach than the United 
States.  This is largely due to consistency in statute and its general application to 
cases throughout the United Kingdom.  There are many more jurisdictions making 
up the United States and each appears to have taken an individual approach to 
surrogacy arrangements. This has resulted in decisions in the United States being 
influenced by many varied factors.  
The following paragraphs examine selected legislation taken from the three 
jurisdictions explored – Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 
STATUTE LAW 
1. Australian Surrogacy Law 
All states in Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have legislation 
pertaining to surrogacy. The Northern Territory has no surrogacy legislation.   
Surrogacy was illegal in Queensland until recently.  The Surrogacy Act 2010 
(Qld) allows altruistic surrogacy arrangements. The Tasmanian legislation does 
not prohibit surrogacy outright but makes it illegal to provide technical or 
professional services in relation to achieving a pregnancy the subject of a 
surrogacy contract.99  The Australian Capital Territory, Victoria and Western 
Australia place relevance on a genetic connection between the surrogate and the 
child born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement.  
                                                 
99 Surrogacy Contracts Act 1993 (Tas), s5. 
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In the Australian Capital Territory the court cannot make a parentage order if the 
child born as a result of a surrogacy agreement is genetically related to the birth 
parent.100 Similar restrictions can be found in Victoria where the Patient Review 
Panel can only approve a surrogacy arrangement if it is satisfied the surrogate 
mother’s oocyte will not be used in the conception of the child. 101 
In Western Australia the court can dispense with certain requirements when 
making a parentage order if the child born as a result of the surrogacy agreement 
is genetically related to one or both of the commissioning parents and not 
genetically related to the birth mother. 102 
Early in 2008 the Queensland parliament resolved to appoint the Investigation 
into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee to investigate and report on criteria to be met 
before entering into an altruistic surrogacy arrangement.103 In October 2008 the 
committee tabled its report and one of the key recommendations was to permit the 
use of the surrogate mother’s egg when accessing assisted reproductive 
technology if endorsed by the Surrogacy Review Panel.  A strong emphasis was 
placed on counselling and medical support. The committee based its findings on 
the final report of the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) on assisted 
reproductive technology and adoption. The VLRC found that “partial surrogacy 
should be permitted and … it should be possible for the surrogate mother’s egg to 
be used in the conception of the child.” This is despite evidence of a study which 
found that not being a genetic parent of the child was an important factor for a 
group of Australian women who had acted as gestational surrogates. It was 
reported that these women did not see themselves as “the true mothers of the 
babies but that the children ‘rightfully belonged to the commissioning couple who 
                                                 
100 Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 24. 
101 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 40 (ab). The Assisted Reproductive Treatment Bill 
2008 (Vic) did not contain this requirement.  However during parliamentary discussions on 4th 
December 2008, seven days before the Act was passed, the Legislative Council voted to amend the Bill 
to include the requirement that the surrogate mother’s oocyte will not be used in the conception of the 
child. 
102 Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 21. These include a requirement the birth parent consent to the parentage 
order and receipt by the birth parent of counselling and legal advice. 
103 Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, Queensland Parliament, Investigation into Altruistic 
Surrogacy Committee Report  (2008) 1. 
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were the true parents.”104  Ironically it was this study which influenced the 
parliamentary amendment to the current Victorian legislation which does not 
allow use of the surrogate’s ovum in a surrogacy arrangement.105  
No amendments were made to the Surrogacy Bill 2009 (Queensland) in relation to 
the use of the surrogate’s ovum in a surrogacy arrangement, so that partial 
surrogacy arrangements, where the surrogate and the child are genetically linked, 
are allowed in Queensland.  
 
U.S.A. Surrogacy Laws 
Surrogacy legislation, like the case law, is not uniform throughout the USA.  
Some states allow surrogacy and support such agreements with legislation,106 
others prohibit surrogacy agreements,107 and others simply have no legislation 
relating to surrogacy.108 The laws of five states - Texas, Florida, Tennessee, 
Arizona and Washington – have been selected to illustrate the different legal 
approaches taken to surrogacy in the United States.  
Texas, Florida and Tennessee have surrogacy laws which distinguish between 
surrogacy arrangements where the child has a direct genetic link to the surrogate 
mother and those where there is no such relationship. Texas only allows 
surrogacy arrangements which do not use the surrogate’s eggs.  Florida has 
different stipulations depending on whether or not the surrogate’s eggs are used, 
and Tennessee, while recognising a distinction between gestational and genetic 
surrogates, is more concerned with ensuring there is a genetic link between the 
commissioning parents and the child. Washington recognizes a genetic 
                                                 
104 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Assisted Reproductive Technology & Adoption, Final Report 
(2007)  177. 
105 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 40 (ab), Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Council, 4th December 2008, 5442 Brian Tee. 
106 For example Florida, Texas, Tennessee. 
107  Surrogacy agreements are prohibited in Arizona. 
108  New Jersey has no legislation relating specifically to surrogacy. 
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distinction, allows for both types of surrogacy arrangement, but determines 
parentage according to specific factors outlined in the statute pertaining to 
parenting responsibilities and functions. Arizona does not distinguish between 
genetic and gestational surrogates but is illustrative of how unfair current 
legislation can be when applied to surrogacy. 
Texas 
In Texas parties may enter into a Gestational Agreement which is subsequently 
validated by the court.109 The gestational mother or surrogate may carry a child 
that is genetically linked to either or both commissioning parents.  Alternatively a 
Gestational Agreement may provide that the surrogate be impregnated with a 
donated egg and sperm.  The important feature about these agreements is the 
requirement that the eggs used in the procedure must be retrieved from an 
intended parent or donor and not the gestational mother.110 The court will not 
approve an agreement where the surrogate is genetically linked to the child.  If a 
Gestational Agreement is not approved it is unenforceable in a court of law.111  
Provided the court has approved the Gestational Agreement, the commissioning 
parents are considered to be the parents of the child born to a gestational mother 
regardless of the fact that the gestational mother gave birth to the child.112 
The state of Texas allows surrogacy arrangements provided there is no genetic 
link between the surrogate mother and the child she delivers.  The legislation is 
clear and the parties know where they stand. 
Florida 
                                                 
109 Tex Fam Code s 160.755 (2010). 
110 Tex Fam Code s 160.754(c) (2010). 
111 Tex Fam Code s 160.762 (2010). 
112 Tex Fam Code s 160.753 (a) (2010). 
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Florida has an extensive legislative regime covering surrogacy.  The Florida 
Statutes allow for two types of surrogacy contracts – Gestational Surrogacy 
Contracts113 and Pre-planned Adoption Agreements.114 
Gestational surrogacy contracts are only available where the commissioning 
mother cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term or where the gestation will 
cause a risk to her health or that of the fetus. 115 One of the commissioning parents 
must be genetically related to the child and the surrogate must have no genetic 
link to the child. 
‘Gestational surrogate’ is defined to mean a woman who contracts to become 
pregnant by means of assisted reproductive technology without the use of an egg 
from her body.116  A “gestational surrogacy contract” means a written agreement 
between the gestational surrogate and the commissioning couple.117 The statute 
requires the parties enter into a gestational surrogacy contract.118 Provisions 
which the agreement must contain are listed and include matters dealing with the 
health and protection of the surrogate and the unborn child.119 It must also provide 
that the gestational surrogate will relinquish any parental rights and 
responsibilities of the child upon the birth regardless of any impairment of the 
child,120 unless it is determined that neither of the commissioning parents is the 
genetic parent of the child.  In that case, the birth mother must assume parental 
rights and responsibilities for the child.121 
Within three days after the birth of the child, the commissioning parents petition 
the court for affirmation of parental status.122 Following the court’s satisfaction of 
certain requirements, it orders that the commissioning parents are the legal parents 
                                                 
113 Fla Stat s 742.15 (2009). 
114 Fla Stat s 63.213 (2009). 
115 Fla Stat s 742.15 (a) – (c) (2009). 
116 Fla Stat s 742.13 (5) (2009). 
117 Fla Stat s 742.13 (7) (2009). 
118 Fla Stat s 742.15 (2009). 
119 Fla Stat s 742.15 (3) (2009). 
120 Fla Stat s 742.15 (3) (a) – (e) (2009). 
121 Fla Stat s 742.15 (3)(e) (2009). 
122 Fla Stat s 742.16 (1) (2009). 
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of the child.123 A substitute birth certificate is issued noting the commissioning 
couple as parents.  The original birth certificate (which would state that the 
gestational surrogate and her husband are the child’s parents) is sealed.124  
Pre-planned Adoption Agreements include, but are not limited to, arrangements 
whereby the surrogate mother has a genetic link to the child she delivers.  They 
also include arrangements for commissioning parents who are unable to use their 
own gametes in a fertilization procedure.  A volunteer mother agrees to undergo a 
fertility technique as specified in the agreement, deliver the child and terminate 
any parental rights and responsibilities in favour of the commissioning parents.125 
However under this type of agreement, there is a right of rescission by the 
volunteer mother any time within 48 hours after the birth of the child.126 “Fertility 
technique” includes artificial embryonation, artificial insemination whether vivo 
or in vitro, egg donation or embryo adoption.127 
In Florida, where the surrogate and the child are genetically linked the 
arrangement falls under the umbrella of a Pre-planned Adoption Agreement.  The 
surrogate is allowed a ‘cooling-off’ period of 48 hours within which time she may 
retract her promise to relinquish the child.  The legislation takes into account the 
justifiable difficulties which may be experienced by a genetically related 
surrogate in relinquishing the child she has delivered. 
Tennessee 
Tennessee does not have legislation specifically directed towards surrogacy 
although reference is make to ‘surrogate birth’ in the Tennessee Code of 
Adoption.128  The Code distinguishes between partial surrogacy and gestational 
surrogacy. 129  However, in either case, the commissioning father must be 
                                                 
123 Fla Stat s 742.16 (6) (2009). 
124 Fla Stat s 742.16 (8) (2009). 
125 Fla Stat s 63.213 (a), (d), (e) (2009). 
126 Fla Stat s 63.213 (2009). 
127 Fla Stat s 63.213 (6) (c) (2009). 
128 Tenn Code Ann s 36-1-102 (2009). 
129 Tenn Code Ann s 36-1-102 (48) (A) (ii) (2009). 
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biologically related to the child born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement. In 
other words, an embryo created by using the gametes of both commissioning 
parents may be placed in the surrogate resulting in the child born that is 
genetically related to both parents. 130  Alternatively the surrogate may be 
inseminated with the sperm of the commissioning father in which case the 
surrogate would have a genetic link to the child.  In both cases there must be a 
contract in existence entered into by the parties. The Code clearly states that it 
does not authorize the surrogate birth process unless otherwise approved by the 
court or general assembly.131 
No surrender132 is necessary to terminate any parental rights of the woman who 
carried the child to term under a surrogate birth and no adoption of the child by 
the biological parent(s) is necessary.133 The statute contemplates the termination 
of parental rights by a surrogate mother in favour of the legal rights of the 
biological mother and/or father.  However, in order to obtain legal parental rights 
to the child a genetically unrelated commissioning mother would have to proceed 
with a step-adoption of the child, following the surrogate mother relinquishing her 
rights. 134 Although the definition of surrogate birth does not contemplate an 
arrangement where the commissioning father has no genetic connection to the 
child, the definition of ‘legal parent’ includes a situation where the father is 
married to the biological mother or was married to her within 300 days prior to 
the birth of the child. This means that where an embryo is created between the 
commissioning mothers ovum and donated sperm, the commissioning mother’s 
husband can still be a ‘legal parent’ under the legislation, despite a lack of 
biological connection to the child.  However where the surrogate is artificially 
                                                 
130 Tenn Code Ann s 36-1-102 (48) (A) (i) (2009). 
131 Tenn Code Ann s 36-1-102 (48) (C) (2009). 
132 Surrender means the execution of a document by the parent or guardian of a child by which that parent 
or guardian relinquishes all rights to the child to another person or body for the purposes of making that 
child available for adoption. See Tenn Code Ann s 30-1-102 (47) (2009). 
133 Tenn Code Ann s 36-1-102 (48) (B) (2009). 
134 Julia Tate, Tennessee’s Law on Surrogacy (2002) The American Surrogacy Centre 
http://www.surrogacy.com/legals/article/tnlaw.html at 11 March 2010. 
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inseminated with the commissioning father’s sperm, the commissioning mother 
cannot become a legal parent unless she proceeds with a step-adoption order.  
In general the laws of Tennessee favour surrogacy arrangements where the 
commissioning mother has a genetic link to the child because the need for 
recourse to adoption is negated.  The parental rights of the surrogate mother can 
be terminated in favour of the biological parents or the biological mother and her 
husband if he is not the biological father.  
Washington 
Surrogacy laws are found in the Revised Code of Washington.135 The definition 
section distinguishes between “surrogate gestation” whereby the surrogate is 
implanted with a genetically unrelated embryo, and “surrogate mother” where a 
female who is not married to the sperm contributor, is naturally or artificially 
inseminated. However a “surrogate parentage contract” is a contract in which a 
female, not married to the contributor of the sperm, agrees to conceive a child 
through natural or artificial insemination or in which a female agrees to surrogate 
gestation, and to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to the child. Although 
the definition distinguishes between surrogates who are genetically linked to the 
child and those who are not, both types of surrogacy are included in the definition 
of a “surrogate parent contract.”136 Where a dispute develops between the parties 
to a surrogate parent contract concerning the custody of the child born pursuant to 
that agreement, the party having physical custody of the child retains custody 
until such time as the court orders otherwise. The court is required to award legal 
custody of the child based on matters such as the child’s relationship with the 
parties, the parenting responsibilities taken by each of the parties so far and 
potential future performance of parenting functions, the child’s relationship with 
siblings, other significant adults and the physical surroundings in which the child 
will be raised.  The conduct of the parent and persons residing with the parent 
                                                 
135 Wash Rev Code s 26.26.210 - 260 (2010). 
136 Wash Rev Code s 26.26.210 (2010) 
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including evidence of physical, sexual, emotional and substance abuse are also 
matters the court must consider.137 The statute does not require the court to 
consider the genetic relationship between the child and the disputing parties.  
Whilst the statute acknowledges the genetic differences in the types of surrogacy 
arrangements which may arise, genetics is not a matter the statute considers 
relevant in determining parentage. If the surrogate mother fails to relinquish the 
child at birth, she retains custody of the child until the court makes an order based 
on the factors listed in the statute.  
A genetic link between the surrogate and the child born as a result of the 
surrogacy arrangement is not a significant factor under the laws of Washington. 
Arizona 
Surrogacy contracts are prohibited in Arizona.138  However legislation states that 
the surrogate is the legal mother of a child born as a result of a surrogate 
parentage contract and is entitled to custody of that child.139 If the mother of a 
child born as a result of a surrogate contract is married, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that her husband is the father of the child.140 The section was tested 
in Soos v Superior Court of the State of Arizona.141 In that case fertilized eggs 
created from the gametes of the commissioning parents were implanted in the 
surrogate who became pregnant with triplets.  Prior to the birth of the babies the 
commissioning mother filed a petition of dissolution of marriage and requested 
shared custody of the unborn triplets with the commissioning father. The 
commissioning father alleged that, since the surrogate was the legal mother 
pursuant to statute, the commissioning mother had no standing to request custody.  
The court found the statute was unconstitutional. 
                                                 
137 Wash Rev Code s 26.09.187 (3) (2010), RCW 26.09.191(2010). 
138 Ariz Rev Stat s 25-218 (2010). 
139 Ariz Rev Stat s 25-218 (B) (2010). 
140 Ariz Rev Stat s 25-218 (C) (2010). 
141 182 Ariz. 470 at 475 (1994). 
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“A.R.S. section 25-218(C) allows a man to rebut the presumption of legal paternity by 
proving “fatherhood” but does not provide the same opportunity for a woman. A woman 
who may be genetically related to a child has no opportunity to prove her maternity and is 
thereby denied the opportunity to develop the parent-child relationship. She is afforded 
no procedural process by which to prove her maternity under the statute….By affording 
the father a procedure for proving paternity, but not affording the mother any means by 
which to prove maternity, the State has denied her equal protection of the laws.”142 
Whilst the case was not one where the surrogate refused to relinquish the child, it 
indicates the courts perspective with respect to the role genetics may play when 
considering parenthood. Pursuant to the legislation, a genetic connection between 
father and child is proof of paternity.143 The court in Soos found that the same 
opportunity to prove maternity by genetic connection should be available to 
women. By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women, the equal 
protection guarantees provided by the United States’ and Arizona constitutions 
were violated.144 However, at the time of writing the legislation remains 
unchanged. 
Under the laws of Arizona surrogacy contracts are void as against public 
policy.145 Parentage is determined according to who delivered the child.  
Summary  
Within the three states examined which placed some relevance on a genetic 
relationship between the surrogate and the child, all three took a different 
approach.  Texan courts will not approve a surrogacy arrangement if the surrogate 
and the child born to the surrogate arrangement are genetically linked. Florida 
recognises both gestational and partial surrogacy arrangements and has specific 
rules relating to each. Where the surrogate is not genetically linked to the child, 
the commissioning parents’ path to parenthood is less hazardous as a requirement 
of relinquishment by the surrogate is enshrined in the statute. A similar distinction 
                                                 
142 182 Ariz. 470 [11] (1994). 
143 ARIZ REV STAT S 25-218 (C) (2010). 
144 Soos v Superior Court of the State of Arizona 182 Ariz. 470 [11] (1994). 
145 Ciccarelli et al, n 40, 129. 
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is made in Tennessee except the emphasis is on a genetic link between one or 
both the commissioning parents and the child, and not between the surrogate and 
the child. 
Legislation in other states places no relevance on genetic ties. Arizona’s 
legislation is not commensurate with the case law. The latter places some 
relevance on a genetic connection but this has not been reflected by statute.  The 
Revised Code of Washington considers a myriad of factors in determining 
parentage, none of which pertain to genetic relationships. 
 
U.K. Surrogacy Laws 
The United Kingdom also has surrogacy legislation.  The Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985 makes surrogacy arrangements unenforceable.146 The Act 
makes no distinction between gestational and partial surrogacy except insofar as 
the definition section refers to “…the time of the insemination or of the placing in 
her of an embryo, of an egg in the process of fertilization or of sperm and eggs, as 
the case may be…”147 Whilst the section acknowledges different methods of 
reproductive technology may be used in either a gestational or partial surrogacy 
arrangement, the consequences for the surrogate and the commissioning parents 
are the same regardless of the type of  surrogacy arrangement. The other United 
Kingdom enactment which addresses the issue of surrogacy is the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA).  Like much legislation governing 
assisted reproductive technology, the HFEA treats the woman carrying or who has 
carried the child as the result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and 
eggs, as the mother of that child.148 The consenting husband of the woman 
carrying the child will be deemed the father of the child. If he has not consented 
and the embryo or sperm and eggs were placed in the woman in the course of 
                                                 
146 Surrogacy Arrnagements Act 1985 (UK) C49, s1A. 
147 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 s 1(6). These words were inserted by Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 36. 
148 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 27(1). 
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treatment services provided for her and a man together then that man shall be 
treated as the father of the child.149  
Where a commissioning couple wishes to become a child’s legal parents 
following a successful surrogacy arrangement they may either seek a parental 
order pursuant to S30 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA) 
provided certain conditions are satisfied, or apply to adopt the child pursuant to 
the Adoption Act 1976.150 
Section 30 HFEA refers to parental orders in favour of gamete donors and relates 
to surrogacy arrangements.  In order to obtain a parental order at least one of the 
parties seeking the order must be genetically linked to the child.151 The woman 
who carried the child must consent unconditionally to the making of the order.152 
It is therefore difficult for commissioning parents to obtain a parental order if the 
surrogate has refused to relinquish the child.  Although the Act requires a genetic 
link between the child and one or both commissioning parents, there is no 
prohibition on fertilizing an egg obtained from the surrogate with the 
commissioning father’s sperm, to create an embryo.  In other words, the Act does 
not make a distinction between a surrogate who is genetically related to the child 
she delivers, and one who is not. 
 
CONCLUSION 
“The path to parenthood has been less a journey along a primrose path, 
more a trek through a thorn forest.”153 
                                                 
149 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 27(2). 
150 United Kingdom, Report of the Surrogacy Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for 
Payments and Regulation, Cmnd 4068 (1998) [5]. 
151 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 30 (1) (b). 
152 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 30 (5). 
153 Re X (Children) (Parental Order: Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030. 
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The issue of surrogacy is dynamic and emotive. If the surrogate mother fails to 
relinquish the child born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement, or subsequently 
makes a custody claim, lives including that of the child, may be thrown into 
turmoil.  
There were some unfortunate incidents of the surrogate failing to relinquish the 
child in all three of the jurisdictions examined. Overall, more than half the 
disputes involving failure, by the surrogate mother, to relinquish the child born as 
a result of a surrogacy arrangement, involved partial surrogacy arrangements.  
The state of Ohio places a very strong emphasis on genetic ties when making 
custody orders in surrogacy cases.  California and Pennsylvania have also relied 
on genetics. The United Kingdom places importance on balancing the advantages 
and disadvantages each party can provide to the child, rather than genetic a 
connection.  However it was clear from a study of the case law that most 
relinquishment issues occur in partial surrogacy arrangements. Although Australia 
is not prolific in case law relating to relinquishment disputes, it is apparent from 
the material available that the court does not consider genetic connection 
irrelevant.  
The writer acknowledges that gestational surrogacy is not a fool proof solution to 
relinquishment failure.  It is one of many factors the legislators must consider 
when drafting in the area of surrogacy. According to the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission “the regulation of surrogacy can play an important role in 
minimizing the potential for disputes and in protecting all parties, including the 
child, from possible harm.”154  
However there is evidence to suggest that where the surrogate mother has no 
genetic link to the child the potential for disputes between the parties is reduced. 
For this reason, the issue of genetics must play a greater role in legislative reform.  
                                                 
154 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Assisted Reproductive Technology and Adoption Report, Final 
Report (2007) [16.178]. 
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Some states in the USA have introduced the absence of a genetic link between the 
surrogate and the child into the legislation.  
Texas and Florida recognize the potential difficulties a genetic surrogate may face 
with relinquishing the child. These jurisdictions are very clear in the distinction 
between partial and gestational surrogacy arrangements. Texas does not allow 
partial surrogacy arrangements. Florida has a “cooling off” period if the surrogate 
mother and child are genetically related, thereby recognizing the possible 
difficulties with relinquishment a genetic surrogate may face.  
In recent times, Australia has undergone major reform in its regulation of 
surrogacy. Three states recognize a distinction between partial and gestational 
surrogacy and two of those states actively discourage partial surrogacy 
arrangements.  Surrogacy arrangements cannot be fulfilled in the ACT or Victoria 
if the surrogate mother is genetically related to the child born as a result of a 
surrogacy arrangement. Western Australia is not so limiting but requirements of 
consent from, and counselling for the surrogate mother may be affected if there is 
a genetic relationship between the surrogate and the child.  
The writer submits gestational and partial surrogacy should be recognized as 
distinct arrangements with the former to be preferred. The use of the surrogate 
mother’s ovum should be discouraged. Attempts to use donated eggs or eggs 
obtained from the commissioning mother should be made.  It is only if this option 
is unsuccessful, not possible or extenuating circumstances exist,155 that the 
surrogate mother’s ovum should be considered. Should such circumstances arise, 
a strict scheme of counselling must be statutorily prescribed. 
“The welfare of the child should be the paramount consideration and should prevail over 
the interests of the adults involved in a surrogate motherhood arrangement”156 
                                                 
155 For example, if the commissioning mother is unable to provide ovum and her sister is the surrogate, 
some genetic link to the commissioning mother may be preferred over using donated eggs. 
156 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Artificial Conception: Surrogate Motherhood, Report No 
60 (1988) [4.1] 
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Because of the potentially serious effects failure to relinquish can have on the 
child and others involved in the surrogacy arrangement, the writer submits 
allowing partial surrogacy arrangements only adds potential for complications. 
However it is acknowledges that a number of factors  -  such as medical costs, 
invasiveness of procedures, success rates, health and fertility of commissioning 
parents, and procedures offered by particular health facilities – may cause a 
surrogate or commissioning parents to choose partial surrogacy.  
Supporters of partial surrogacy argue it is unfair to the commissioning parents to 
prescribe limitations on access to surrogacy by prohibiting a genetic link between 
the surrogate and the child born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement.  There 
are women who are unable to produce their own gametes.  Donated ovum may 
not be available and, in any case, requires a more invasive medical procedure than 
artificial insemination.157  Due to the nature of the procedures involved, 
gestational surrogacy is a more expensive option than partial surrogacy as the IVF 
procedure is technically more complex.158 These are well founded arguments.  It 
is not intended to limit the option of surrogacy to only those women with viable 
ova.  However, the welfare of the child born as a result of the surrogacy 
arrangements is of paramount importance. To protect the interests of the child, an 
effort must be made to ensure surrogate arrangements work.  Relinquishment 
must take place with no issues of hostility or refusal. Any risks should be 
ameliorated.   If this is at the expense of an adult, for the benefit of a child, then it 
is a consequence of the child’s best interests being paramount and, therefore, of 
good legal principle. The writer submits legislation relating to surrogacy should 
be drafted to encourage gestational surrogacy arrangements. Partial surrogacy 
should only occur in exceptional circumstances in a heavily sanctioned 
surrounding of counselling and medical support. 
 
 
                                                 
157 Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy, Final Report, (2008), Chapter 4, 48. 
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